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Labor and the Shernman Act. By Edward Berman. New York,
Harper & Bros., 1930. pp. xviii, 332. $3.
HIGH expectations are aroused when the author states that the purposes of
this study are "to determine whether or not Congress intended that the
Sherman Act should be applied to labor unions, . . . to describe the appli-
cation of the Act to labor organizations, to analyze its effects, to evaluate
these effects from an economic and social viewpoint, and to suggest to what
extent and in which direction the present situation might profitably be
changed." (p. 5).
Although the Sherman Law has been applied to labor activities since
1893 by the lower courts and since 1908 by the Supreme Court, in over
eighty cases, and although the Clayton Act was passed in 1914 on the as-
sumption that labor activities were subject to the ban of the Sherman
Law, it is not without interest to determine how far this result was con-
templated by the Congress of 1890. But the author's claim of having
proved that "Congress never intended that the Act of 1890 should be
applied to labor unions" (p. 265) is rather extravagant. His inquiry does
not extend to the forces which led to the introduction of the anti-
trust legislation, the contemporary literature, or even to the Congressional
debates on the general purposes of the legislation and the evils sought to be
remedied.' It is confined to a keen analysis of the portions of the debates
dealing directly with labor organizations, the process by which the bill
introduced by Senator Sherman became law, and the language of the bill in
the course of this process. He does thus convincingly refute those,2 in-
cluding the Supreme Court, who found in the legislative history of the Act
a positive intention on the part of Congress to include labor organizations,
but beyond that his argument only "illustrates how fictitious can become
the search by courts for the intent of the legislature in construing ambigu-
ous enactments." The courts found "meaning where Congress had done its
best to conceal meaning." 3
The history of this yet unfinished process of the judicial moulding of the
Sherman Law is told in considerable detail with a studious analysis of the
opinions in the more important cases under it. Without detracting from
the quality of this analysis one or two observations should be made.
Although lower federal courts have too frequently given support to such an
interpretation, 4 the Supreme Court did not hold in the second Co;,Mzado
1 For the value of investigation of the legislative history in the inter-
pretation of statutes, see Landis, A Note on "Statutory Iflt(p'ctatioln"
(1930) 43 HARv. L. RIv. 886; cf. Radin, Stat utory Intcrprctatigiz, ibid. 863.
2 Particularly MASON, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LA W (1925) 119 et sq.
3 FRANKFURTER A.N\-D GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 144-1.
4 The New York Court of Appeals has recently halted a tendency on the
part of lower New York courts to be more liberal in the issuance of injunc-
tions than was warranted by its own decisions. See Note (1927) 40 HAiR.




case5 "that an interference with production within a state (by an ordinary
strike) was a violation of the Sherman Act, if the intent to restrain coin-
merce existed." It did not hold "a coal strike to be a violation of the Act.',J
The Court was dealing with a case of interference by serious violence and
conduct admittedly unlawful apart from the Sherman Act and its decision
was expressly restricted to restraints of that kind.7 A peaceful strike
does not fall within this decision and is apparently exempted by the Clayton
Act, even as that Act has been emasculated in the Duplex case.8 It might
further be pointed out that the significance of the author's statistics upon
the judicial use of the Sherman Law in labor disputes should be considered
in the light of certain facts relating to the cases upon which the statistics
are based. Not only is diversity of citizenship the sole basis of jurisdiction
in probably two thirds of the labor cases in the federal courts,9 but in many
of the suits involving the Sherman Law bases for jurisdiction other than
the Law were relied upon, so that relief might have been granted even had
the Law not been invoked. Furthermore, while in the author's count the
case is the unit, in many instances a single dispute has occasioned from one
to a dozen cases.
From his analysis of the cases, the author deduces that restraints of pro-
duction, transportation or marketing will each constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act if the court finds an accompanying intent to restrain inter-
state commerce. (p. 202). Taking the notion of intent very literally, he
urges convincingly the futility of "a research into the minds of men [when]
skilled psychologists and scientists ...have so far failed to produce an
accurate technique capable of determining man's thoughts and purposes,"
and points out the absurdity of resolving contentious social and economic
issues on the basis of such a research. (p. 239). The notion of intent, he
proposes, should be entirely abandoned in favor of a "developed rule of
reason in its highest form," which postulates two questions: first, is the
restraint "direct, material and substantial." (pp. 230-1). If so, is it also
socially harmful, that is, are "the benefits resulting from permitting the
activity" socially less desirable than "the benefits resulting from prohibit-
ing it"? (p. 241). Through this technique the factor of social philosophy
will be brought out into the open. Then "the facts as to the social and
economic effects of an act", being objective in character, can be "studied
and discovered" with the aid of political science, sociology, and economics.
(p. 241). While persons with different social philosophies would even then
reach different results, "nevertheless the conscious application of a rule
based upon considerations of social welfare would in time do much to im-
prove the position of labor under the law." (p. 266). And if bias Is
found, judges, lawyers and the public may be educated "along the lines of a'
just policy." (p. 242).
But all this is quite disappointing to the expectations aroused in the
opening pages. One looked forward to a rather concrete analysis and
evaluation of the "social and economic effects" on a particular labor dis-
pute of judicial interference in the name of the Sherman Law; perhaps
also of its effects on the collective bargaining movement, or even on the
"social welfare" in general. Instead, one gets the usual type of assertion
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct.
551 (1925).
e Pp. 129, 159, 198-9, 237, 248.
7 Supra note 5 at 310, 45 Sup. Ct. at 556.
8 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172
(1921).
9 FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, op cit. supra note 3, at 210.
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and inference, albeit reasonable, based on the cases alone. One had expected
a statement of "social and economic facts" to aid future action. Instead,
one gets rather elementary theorizing which, again, is well done, but adds
nothing to what has been urged by dissenting judges for over a quarter of
a century. While it is undoubtedly desirable, as Mr. Justice Holmes has
long insisted,'0 to bring social considerations to the forefront, rather than
leave them inarticulate, it would be too sanguine to look for different re-
sults through the application of the author's technique. The cases in which
Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented and forcefully presented these considera-
tions doom such hopes, even apart from the still lamentable infrequency of
the Brandeis and Frankfurter type of brief. Moreover, the one sure result
of our whole experience with labor disputes and "government by injunc-
tion" is the very great resentment that has been aroused against judicial
decision of labor contests according to the social philosophy of the court.
No judge, whether in a District Court or the Supreme Court, would at this
day be justified in deciding a labor case on his own notions, however firm,
of the value of collective bargaining. Nor should he, on such grounds,
attempt to set the limits of permissible contest, merely because his position
enables him to do so. In this field he is dealing with the tensest and
most crucial kind of social and economic issues. Proper regard for his
function and the limitations of his machinery should compel him to defer
his own judgment and avoid interfering whenever possible. The Sherman
Law is conveniently vague for this purpose. Labor would do better not to
pin too much faith on the education of judges "along the lines of a just
policy," but to bend its every effort to secure the passage of the Shipstead
Bill, now pending in Congress. Judges should insist upon full specification
by the legislature before they attempt to deal with such highly combustible
issues.- Only within very limited, spheres should the judiciary be called
upon to apply the author's technique.
New Haven, Conn. HARRY SHULMAN.
Judge and Jury. By Leon Green. Kansas City, Vernon Law
Book Co., 1930. pp. vi, 429.
THis book purports to be no more than an effort to develop an understand-
ing of tort law. But its many flashes of insight, which light up the entire
judicial process, stamp it as much more than that. The book is not an
orderly development of legal rules or legal philosophy. Rather it is an ex-
position of the place which legal rules hold in the judicial process. Illus-
trations are chosen from the field of torts, but they might have been taken
with equal success from any of the conventional departments of the law.
In describing the function of the elaborate logical technique of the law, the
author combines a defense of legal theories with an attack on the use of
them by legal theorists. His conclusions concerning the necessity of logical
rules are conservative, but his reasons therefor will be somewhat disquiet-
ing to legal fundamentalists. In fact some of them have already indicated
a profound distrust of their new champion.
The author's treatment of torts is brilliant and original, chiefly because
his underlying point of view is unusual. Those who devote their lives to
legal scholarship usually tend to emphasize rules, standards, and princi-
10 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Blass. 92, 104, 105-6 (1896) ; Plant -. Woods,
176 Mass. 492, 504 (1900).
'-'-Cf. Brandeis, J., in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Dcering, supra note
8, at 479, 488, 41 Sup. Ct. at 181, 184.
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ples. These are always proclaimed by appellate courts. An unconscious
assumption seems to follow that other agencies of justice such as trial
courts and juries are unimportant. They impinge only on the fringes of
consciousness. The truth is that more than ninety per cent of litigation
depends on their action, uncensored by appeal. But inasmuch as equity
assumes that that is done which ought to be done, may not the legal scholar
assume that these lower bodies are following directions? Inconsistencies of
result may always be explained in two ways: (a) that they are caused by
decisions on mere questions of procedure which do not affect substantive
law no matter how much they affect the litigant, and (b) that the question
involved is not one of "law" at all but one of "fact". Whether a jury or a
court determines this question of "fact" is merely a matter of procedure,
provided the jury is properly instructed in the substantive law. If the jury
is not astute enough to understand these instructions, that is no part of the
law of torts. This is almost necessarily the consequence of considering the
substantive law of torts and the procedure as separate fields of investiga-
tion. The members of any priesthood are necessarily more concerned with
the proper expression of a creed than in conduct. Hence the point of de-
parture in legal study has generally come to be the philosophical obser-
vations of the appellate courts.
The originality of this book lies in the fact that the author does not
center his attention on the appellate court. He is interested in the effect of
the whole judicial process on a tort case. Instructions to juries on negli-
gence are unimportant as part of the substantive law of negligence but ex-
tremely significant as part of a ritual to put the jury in the proper frame
of mind to decide the case. The important thing is whether the jury is to
be given any power in the case, and if so how much. The difference be-
tween procedure and substantive law is a useful device for one who is
making an index of decisions, but nothing more.
Courts are looked upon by the author as an agency of government not
essentially different from any other body of officials whose duty it is to
make decisions regulating human conduct. Public officers must, however,
explain what they do, and tradition requires that the explanations of courts
be consistent. Sometimes their decisions will be in the form of definite
administrative directions, sometimes inspirational sermons, and sometimes
necessary self-justification. Explanation will be equally necessary whether
they adopt the language of the social scientist or confine themselves to
Blackstone. The necessity for this combination of a practical formula and
a mystical creed is one of the important factors in making a decision. Mr.
Green calls it the "administrative factor." He classifies others of equal
importance as moral, economic, preventative factors, and, as a final one,
adds the justice factor-the emotional reaction of the court to the situation
of the parties before it. Needless to say this last has greater influence
with the trial court and jury who do not have to explain their actions on
the printed page, just as the importance of the logical creed will often
appear uppermost with the appellate court.
Dean Green's book examines the effect of these factors on the decision of
a tort case as it goes through the various bodies which divide the responsi-
bility of deciding it-the trial judge, the jury, and the appellate court.
Thus the law of torts is made to appear as a process to which disputes are
subjected. Only by understanding the steps in the process, the methods of
delimiting the functions of the jury, the trial and appellate courts, can we
achieve anything but a fictitious predictability.
The chapter on "Jury Trial and the Appellate Courts" is a particularly
brilliant presentation of an idea too often overlooked because of the empha-
sis which law schools place upon what appellate courts say. The author
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undertakes to demonstrate that the entire system of doctrines, rules and
principles is an ingenious device which appellate courts use to keep trial
courts and juries under control. It is by means of these that they exercise
and extend their power. Once the appellate court says that the violation
of a so-called rule is not "prejudicial error" or that action on the part of
the trial court is "discretionary," we find that the rules of law involved
vanish like a snow bank under a summer sun. The appellate court may
still reverse but they must say why in terms of the particular case; and
in this they are handicapped by the fact that the trial court knows more
about the case than they do, and can state it in terms with which it is diffi-
cult to find fault. Elaborate rules give power to appellate courts; words
sounding in "discretion," "the facts of the case are peculiar," etc., trans-
fer the power to the trial court. The history of legal doctrine is in part,
at least, a history of the increase in the control which appellate courts have
insisted upon exerci.ing behind the lines.
No one interested in legal institutions can afford to miss the stimulation
which an intelligent consideration of the ideas in this book will afford. It
is the starting point for new intellectual adventures. The reviewer pre-
dicts that it will perhaps be the inspiration of a study, such as has not
yet been made, of the American Trial Court. In spite of the fact that its
activities are all that most litigants are ever concerned with, this great
institution still lies buried under layers of legal dialectic.
New Haven, Conn. THun=AN W. AnN0LD.
InternationaZ Arbitration from Athcnos to Locarno. By Jackson
H. Ralston. Stanford University, Calif., Stanford University
Press, 1929. pp. xvi, 417. $5.
THE author of this book has rendered such useful service to the profession
by his digest of the decisions and holdings of international tribunals in his
Law a-ad Procedure of Intenatiotal Tribuyals and he has in other ways
manifested so high a degree of social usefulness that we were entitled to
expect more from a work bearing so expansive a title as the one under
review. The reviewer was a little taken aback by the statement in the
preface that "the only book containing in detail pronouncements of arbi-
tral and other international courts of justice remains the Law and Proce-
dure of InternatirnaI Tribu=Nal by the present author." Thus to overlook
the sx-volume work of Moore, which is still the source book for most work
of the kind the author has here undertaken, excites wonder.
The book is mainly descriptive rather than analytical. It is divided into
five parts, of which the first, derived largely from the digest paragraphs
of the author's previous volume above mentioned, seems the best. This
part deals with the functions of international tribunals, the reservations to
arbitration teaties, the essentials of the compromis, the question of juris-
diction, the form and procedure of arbitration, the internal law of arbitral
tribunals, and international awards, including the sources of their invalid-
ity and their force. The author indulges his known strictures upon inter-
national law announced in his Dcnocraqy's I tzational Law and ex-
pounds his thesis that international law is largely contrary to the "natural
law" governing individuals. As he makes his own definition of natural
law, namely, the psychological reactions produced by certain stimuli, it is
not easy to quarrel with him. But he speaks not profoundly of a much
See Book Review (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 520.
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discussed subject. He properly objects to titles based on conquest and the
supposedly binding character of treaties imposed by duress and violence.
The historical fact, however, seems to be that, unless such treaties are
acquiesced in, they rarely last long. His strictures upon the laws of war
and neutrality, which he refuses to recognize as anything but practices,
whatever that may Mean, are unfounded. Admitting the folly of the
institution of war as a mark of a defective and retarded civilization, the
necessity for rules for conducting the duel, which materially affects third
parties, is self-evident. Without such rules, the chaos would become prac-
tically universal, and force completely subjugate law. Indeed, the surprise
should be not at occasional violation, but at the degree of observance. The
arbitral tribunals which Mr. Ralston discusses have enforced tnese rules,
thus refuting much of the author's argument. The objection to the sug-
gestion that arbitration is a process of compromise, and not judicial, not-
withstanding the distinguished name the suggestion bears, is well taken.
For the distinction between political and legal questions the author assem-
bles many quotations, but he has missed important ones, such as the con-
tributions of Lauterpacht. His emphasis on legislation as a necessary fac-
tor to facilitate arbitration and correct decisions, while endorsed by others,
is very debatable. On the power of tribunals to decide upon their own
jurisdiction, a most important question, the author overlooks the volu-
minous literature which developed out of the decision of the Rumanian-
Hungarian tribunal on the optants' question. Other decisions of mixed
arbitral tribunals in this connection deserve consideration. German litera-
ture is practically unnoticed throughout. On the Calvo clause as a juris-
dictional clause, the author quotes a number of divergent opinions, but
apparently leaves unmentioned the important decision of the Mexican-
United States tribunal in the North American Dredging Co. case 2 in 1926,
approved by the British-Mexican tribunal in Mexican Union Ry. Case.
On individuals before international courts (p. 68), much more should have
been said; the subject has a literature. So with the "interior law of in-
ternational tribunals."
Part II, on the influences working toward judicial settlement, deals with
the movements-literary, legislative, and propagandist-which promoted
international arbitration. A chapter is devoted to Latin-American work,
but the Jay treaty is better entitled to mention among the modern pioneers.
Part III, on the history of arbitral tribunals, devotes two chapters (36
pages) to the 2200 years from ancient Greece to the Jay treaty. Most of
the information in this sketchy record comes from Raeder, Tod, and Phillip-
son. The notable contributions to arbitration of the 12th and 13th cen-
turies among the Italian city-states, so learnedly recorded and analyzed by
Frey,4 are not even mentioned. A fragmentary account is given of the
early American arbitrations and those to which the United States and
Great Britain, the United States and Mexico, and the United States and
other countries have been parties-all of them, down to 1896, fully covered
by Moore; a few arbitrations between other nations are also briefly
described. Darby did much of this work, but for reference a new
recital is not without utility. The work of the defunct Central American
Court of Justice is briefly set forth. To the important mixed arbitral tri-
bunals under the recent peace treaties, three pages are devoted. Several
2 North American Dredging Co. of Texas v. United Mexican States
(1926) 20 Am. J. INT. LAw 800.
3 (1930) 24 Am. J. INT. LAW. 388, 394.
4 See Book Review (1931) 25 Am. J. INT. LAW 192.
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important recent arbitrations, such as that of the Standard Oil Company
against the Reparation Commission,5 do not appear to be noted.
Parts IV and V deal with the work of The Hague conferences, which
were indeed most important for arbitration, and with the cases before the
Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Permanent Court of International
Justice. International commissions of inquiry are noted. As a descriptive
survey of modern arbitrations, the work will be of interest. As an analy-
tical or philosophical work, it largely fails. Perhaps the author had no
such aspirations.
New Haven, Conn. EDWIN M. BORCHARD.
The Poor Law Code. By W. Ivor Jennings. London, Charles
Knight & Co., Ltd., 1930. pp. Lxxx,,iii, 302. 10/6.
THIS book, unlike many of the published annotations of English statutes,
is not dedicated merely to the needs of the practicing solicitor or barrister.
By means of a masterly introduction, which is entitled, "The Administra-
tion of the Poor Law," Mr. Jennings traces the evolution of poor relief in
Great Britain from the original acts in 1388 to the last revisions in 1930.
It is through this essay, and the author's summary of the general effect of
each section of the Poor Law Act, 1930, that the book presents for Ameri-
can students a concise but carefully considered survey of this important
phase of local government in England.
The significance of the Poor Law Act, 1930, rests, as Mr. Jennings points
out, not so much in the number of new amendments to existing statutes, as
in the fact that by it "for the first time the poor law is reduced to manage-
able proportions, and any intelligent person, even though be has no legal
training, can now see at least the main principles of the law" (p. lxxi).
This is a normal outcome of the evolution of parliamentary acts. Cen-
turies of accumulation in the form of superimposed statutes and depart-
mental rules and orders eventually create an unwieldy mass of enactments,
difficult to administer, and often defectively bound together. Then it be-
comes necessary for Parliament by one new act to correlate and simplify.
The most important modern change in the method of poor relief occurred
in 1929 through the Local Government Act of that year. The Poor Laws,
since the famous and still basic Act of 1601, had in many ways been the
core of local government powers. Each parish was given the power as well
as the duty to put its able-bodied unemployed to work, to provide appren-
ticeships for children, and to give relief to the elderly indigent. That
scheme was substantially unchanged until 1834, when, as a result of the
report of a famous Royal Commission, Parliament sought to remedy the
defects which had been brought to light during the intervening centuries.
The chief defects had been the faulty administration of the justices, in
whom control of poor relief had been vested, the heavy charges that had
fallen upon the landowners, and the failure of administrators to carry out
their duty under the Act of 1601 to find work for those who were able to
work. By the Act of 1834, the administration of poor relief was given to a
specially created Poor Law Commission. Relief to able-bodied persons
was curtailed, and an attempt was made to merge individual parishes into
larger districts for the purposes of the Act. Thereafter came the inevita-
ble crystallization of commission procedure, which, as in other cases, was
unpopular to the extent that efficiency was achieved at the expense of the
traditions of the British Constitution. In 1871, the Poor Law Commission
was absorbed by the Local Government Board, which in turn was super-
(1926) 22 Am. J. INT. LAW 404.
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seded in 1919 by the Ministry of Health. The chief change under the
Local Government Act, 1929, was to abolish the old local boards of guard-
ians and to make the county councils the administration agencies, subject
to the central control of the Ministry of Health. It will be readily seen
that this evolution has created interesting problems in the relation of the
local political units to the central government in Westminster. These
problems are adequately treated in the author's annotations to the sections
of the new consolidating act.
Two questions arise in the mind of one who looks across an ocean at the
phenomena of English legislation. The first concerns the fact, as Mr.
Jennings states, that the Act of 1601 is still the basis for poor relief. The
evolution is said to have been in the administration of the theories of relief
rather than in the theories themselves. It would, however, be idle to sup-
pose that even in England "principles" so bound up in economics and sociol-
ogy as are those of the poor laws have remained immutable for more than
four hundred years. The answer would perhaps be found in the inarticu-
late shift of principles through the multiplication of departmental rules and
orders. Mr. Jennings himself concludes that, in spite of the 1930 Act,
which was supposed to reduce to its lowest terms the evolution of four cen-
turies, "the law must . . . be considered to be in an experimental stage"
(p. lxxxviii). Do Parliament, the Minister of Health and the County
Councils presume still to experiment with immutable principles?
The second question concerns the relation of the poor laws to the current
problem of unemployment. If as early as 1601 it was deemed to be the
duty of the parishes to find work for those who could work, and in the
alternative, to give relief, is the government's present dealing with the un-
employed ancilliary to the poor law relief, or an entirely new undertaking?
Two sections (15 and 45) of the new act deal with relief of the able
bodied unemployed. In his commentaries on section 45, Mr. Jennings sug-
gests that in times of depression, the authorities will give relief %ithout
exacting labor. But there seems to be no provision in the act for deter-
mining the relation between the relief it provides by its own terms, and
that which may be available through other agencies.' This may be a
hiatus readily understood by students of the problem in England. But in
the United States the relation between emergency legislation to cope with
unemployment and the traditional forms of poor relief has yet to be deter-
mined.
Mr. Jennings' book is admirably organized with its tabular outlines of
the changes in the poor laws, its cross-references to preceding acts, and its
appendices of statutory rules and orders. It represents a commendable
attempt to give to a professional annotation some of the breadth and scope
of such extra-legal treatments of the subject as the Webbs' History of Poor
Relief.
New Haven, Conn. RICHARD JOYCE SiITI.
1 Mr. Jennings himself has written on the extent to which poor law relief
will be given to industrial workers on strike. Jennings, Poor Relief in
Industrial Disputes (1930) 46 L. Q. Ruv. 225.
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How to Find the Law. A Legal Refc'cizce Handbook, Including
CGwupters on Brief Making. By Fred A. Eldean. St. Paul,
West Publishing Co., 1931. pp. xw, 782. $3.
THE reader who, with curiosity aroused by the publishers' statement that
they have issued "a new type of book on the subject of legal bibliography,"
examines MAr. Eldean's How to Find the Law, is doomed to disappointment.
It might with greater accuracy have been described as a revised and re-
arranged edition of Cooley's Brief Mak-ing and the Use of Law Books. A
comparison of Mr. Eldean's book with the fifth edition of Cooley reveals the
fact that chapters 12 to 19 are identical, except for a few foot-notes and
typographical changes, with Cooley's Chapters 30 to 37 respectively. These
chapters, by Professors Wambaugh, Sunderland, Crandall and Redfield,
have been regular features of the successive editions of Cooley. Chapters
20 and 22 rearrange, bring down to date and add some new material to,
Cooley's Part VI. Chapter 21 brings together sections of Cooley's Chapters
3 and 4. Most of the remaining chapters are based on corresponding parts
of Cooley. They have been rewritten, condensed and usually much improved,
so that they are undoubtedly Mr. Eldean's and new, although they can
scarcely be said to be of a new type. He has done well to eliminate the
long descriptions of specific books contained in Cooley's Chapters 15-27.
Chapter 10 corresponds in subject matter with Cooley's Chapter 20, but is a
better substitute for it.
In Cooley's work, pages reproduced from law books, with photographs of
the books such as are used in advertising circulars, are grouped at the end
of the volume. Mx. Eldean uses many of the same pictures and a smaller
number of specimen pages, but intersperses them in the text at appropriate
places. Theoretically this is a good idea, but in practice, typographical
confusion and physically bad book-making are the results. It may be
doubted also whether the use of facsimile pages at all is a good device.
Certainly they are poor substitutes for handling the books themselves, and
should not be allowed to delay that experience.
Whether that part of Mr. Eldean's task which consisted in rearranging
Mr. Cooley's materials should have been undertaken is a question on which
opinions may differ. But once it was undertaken, the scissors should not
have been spared. For example, the present rearrangement brings within
eight pages of each other two separate tables of fRegnal Years which in
Cooley were 466 pages apart. A comparison of these tables shows that
they differ in important details.
Mr. Eldean's Chapter 11, "Business Data for the Lawyer," by Professors
Nathan Isaacs and Georges F. Doriot, has no counterpart in Cooley. The
underlying idea of combining legal with non-legal bibliographical data is
excellent but not new, a fact which was illustrated as long ago as 1914 by
Kaiser's Law, Legislative and Municipal Ref¢crcnce Libraries. The chap-
ter has been prepared by capable hands and will be useful. It is unfor-
tunate, however, that no mention is made of the Public Affairs Information
Service, of which the sixteenth annual cumulation was issued in 1930. This
co-operative, non-commercial enterprise of a group of American libraries,
published weekly, and cumulated five times a year, goes a long way toward
providing an index of trade and business journals, the lack of which the
authors deplore. Its character, scope and aims are such as entitle it to a
prominent place in a chapter on business data for lawyers.
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The Law of Insolvency in British India. Tagore Law Lectures,
1929. By Sir Dinshah Fardunji Mulla. Bombay, James &
Co., 1930. pp. lxvii, 933. Rs. 12.
AT a time like the present when there is serious attention being given to
the adequacy of our own bankruptcy system, this volume has more than
ordinary utility. That there" is something to be gained from studying the
experience of other nations in dealing with the same or similar phenomena
of insolvency is now being more generally recognized." This book makes
it easier to carry that exploration to one more field.
Mulla's work is a treatise on the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act of
1909 and the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1920, two Indian bankruptcy
statutes of complementary territorial jurisdiction, the texts of which, to-
gether with the supplemental court rules, form a large part of the book.
But to these the author has added, besides a copious citation of cases, both
English and Indian, an excellent discussion of the comparable provisions
of the two acts and of the analogous rules of the English, and even occas-
ionally of the American, bankruptcy laws. As a legal text the work is on
a high scholarly plane. The analysis is keen and incisive; doctrines are
traced through to their origin in earlier statutes or to their roots in the
earlier common law. The author does more than translate, interpret and
expound the rules of the cases in the orthodox way. In a manner some-
times ironic, at all times pointed and untempered, he offers his own criti-
cisms of statutes, cases and administration, bringing to the book a flavor
that is unusual.
After speaking of the neglect of the administration in bankruptcy to
investigate the conduct of the bankrupt, the author adds: "Unless some
reform is made, the Insolvency Court will continue to be a place of pil-
grimage for debtors, to enter at one door with offerings of debts for the
gods presiding in it, and to depart at the other door, discharged from all
their debts and all their sins." But for the figure of speech, the picture is
strikingly familiar here. Similarly, India, as well as this country, appears
troubled with the problem of the "apathetic" creditors who "write off their
debts and take no further action," and with the task of making more
effective the criminal provisions of the-statute. To be sure the glimpses of
the problems of administration and the manner of the laws' operation are
given a place of secondary importance. But added to the solid and sub-
stantial text they greatly increase the interest and utility of the volume
to those concerned with a comparative law treatment of this important
subject.
. New Haven, Conn. WILIAM 0. DOUGLAS.
Crime and the Criminal Law in the United States. By Harry
Best. New York, The MacMillan Co., 1930. pp. xvii, 615.
$6.50.
To say that this is a conventional text book of crime and criminal law,
written in the conventional terms of that curious science, sociology, is to
express both the merits and the faults of the work. The first one hundred
pages are a condensation of the ordinary short text on criminal law. They
cover almost all the definitions in current use, the conventional classifica-
tion of crimes, and all of criminal procedure, both federal and state.
1 See DON0VAN BANKRUPTCY EPORT.
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After reading it, the elementary student would unquestionably think that
he had acquired valuable information and would be able to talk with some
facility about the subject. Perhaps this is a useful thing to teach him to
do, although some suspect that it is not. The bulk of the book consists of
a discussion of the many detailed tables of statistics which it contains.
Herein may lie its particular usefulness, although this great mass of in-
formation is impossible to evaluate without testing it out on some particu-
lar problem. But if the statistics are at all accurate it would certainly be
easier to find them in this book than to hunt them down in their original
sources. The conclusions reached by the author are the usual ones. Vari-
ous things about our administration of criminal justice must be made big-
ger, better, higher, greater, and fuller, depending on thing to be improved;
many of the things which the author says in this connection are unques-
tionably true.
